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THE COLD VACUUM OF ARMS CONTROL IN
OUTER SPACE: CAN EXISTING LAW MAKE SOME
ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS ILLEGAL?
JEFFREY A. MURPHY
ABSTRACT
The current space law paradigm came into existence when two major national
powers were vying for supremacy after a catastrophic world war. The nuclear age had
dawned. The United Nations drafted and ratified the Outer Space Treaty under these
conditions with limited foresight to the specific nature of future space activities. As
more nations and private actors enter the space arena, the nature of the weapons used
in space has changed, and the number of targets and opportunities for collateral
damage has greatly increased.
This Note looks at the weapons aimed at space and the laws that try to govern
them. Between the United Nations Charter, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Outer
Space Treaty, this Note argues that debris-causing, non-nuclear weapons are forbidden
by Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty (among others) as weapons of mass
destruction. The legality of these weapons is a critical question as more and more of
society depends on orbital infrastructure in their daily lives, and the population in
orbit, who are directly at risk from space weapons, is only going to increase in the
future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine waking up one morning to find that cell phones do not work, calls cannot
be made or received, the internet is unreachable, financial markets are not operational,
payment transactions cannot be processed, and emergency responders cannot find
those in need of help. The potential effects of losing the capabilities of satellites would
ripple through society from the most sophisticated to the least developed nation. Of
the nearly 5,000 satellites in orbit around our planet,1 there are those for military
operations, those for civilian use, and those for both purposes. Mankind’s reliance on
the orbiting infrastructure has become so great that losing the functionality of even
one satellite to a passing space rock could potentially have far-reaching consequences
and would multiply with every disabled satellite.2 The natural hazards threatening
space infrastructure are unpredictable because even small, undetectable objects can
unleash critical damage. High energy particles ejected from the sun, known as space
weather, have caused havoc for satellites and astronauts, including the complete loss
of a Japanese satellite in 2003.3 The greatest threat to Earth’s orbiting infrastructure,
though, is not the harsh space environment but rather man-made orbital debris.
Orbital debris can be created by successful launches in the form of an abandoned
rocket stage or discarded bolts and also by unsuccessful missions, resulting in disabled
satellites or scrap from a damaged satellite. A satellite or other man-made space object
can create (or become) space debris from internal failures or external collisions,
accidental or otherwise. There are threats from weapons targeting satellites for
intentional collision, but the threat from accidental collisions rise with increased
debris.4

1

Space Debris Sensor on Orbit Status, Orbital Debris Q. News, May 2018.

2 See Dr. Lewis Dartnell, What Would Happen If Satellites Fell from the Sky?, THE TELEGRAPH

(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/10785683/What-would-happen-ifsatellites-fell-from-the-sky.html; What Are Satellites Used For?, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/what-are-satellites-usedfor#.W5APGOhKiUk (last updated Jan. 15, 2015).
3

David F. Webb & Joe H. Allen, Spacecraft and Ground Anomalies Related to the OctoberNovember 2003 Solar Activity, 2 SPACE WEATHER 3008, 3008 (2004),
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2004SW000075.
4
About
Space
Debris,
EUROPEAN
SPACE
AGENCY,
https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/About_space_debris
(last
visited Oct. 24, 2019).
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For as long as satellites have existed, nations have developed anti-satellite
weapons (ASATs).5 Mankind’s reach into space was a search for the ultimate high
ground.6 The strategic military advantage gained by intelligence gathered from orbit
justifies the strategy of defensive weapons that target satellites. Destroying a satellite
could blind a country’s military. The use of some ASAT technology could also create
a cloud of lethal debris in Earth’s orbit that endangers civilian and military assets alike.
An estimated 700,000 pieces of debris greater than one centimeter in size are already
in orbit now.7 The likelihood of catastrophic damage from a collision increases nonlinearly as the amount of debris rises, even from debris as small as one centimeter.8
Between the widespread effects on the public of destroying a satellite and the
expanded risk of collateral damage to non-targeted satellites and persisting debris,
certain ASAT weapons should be recognized as illegal under current international law.
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) in orbit,9 but ASAT weapons are not in the category of what is colloquially
thought to be a WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons).10 Scholars have
examined the legality of ASAT weapons under several aspects of international law,

5 JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, THE POLITICS OF SPACE SECURITY 100 (2d ed. 2011) (stating Operation
Bold Orion was the first ASAT test in October 1959).
6 Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called space the ultimate “high ground.”
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003: Hearings on S.
2225 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 107th Cong. 23 (2002) (statement of Hon. Donald
H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def.).
7 How Many Space Debris Objects Are Currently in Space, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY,
http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineering_Technology/Clean_Space/How_many_
space_debris_objects_are_currently_in_orbit (last visited Sept. 18, 2018).
8 Alexander William Salter, Space Debris: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Orbital
Commons, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221, 222–23 (2016). The non-linear increase is not as
obvious. As debris collides with debris it causes more debris as a result. This is known as the
Kessler Syndrome. Paul B. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 475,
475 (2018).
9

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
10
HLS 101 – Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), E. KY. UNIV.,
https://ekuonline.eku.edu/homeland-security/hls-101-weapons-mass-destruction-wmd
(last
visited Oct. 24, 2019).
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including treaties governing weapons and the execution of war.11 Most of the prior
work highlights a failure in space law to properly address the issue of ASATs.12
This Note argues that at least some ASAT weapons are illegal under existing law
based on the characteristics of the weapons and their effects, especially space debris.
A definitive treaty to address the testing and use of ASAT weapons, specifically,
would be the best solution.13 International outlook toward space policy has been
shifting from global institutionalism that begat Cold War treaties (including the Outer
Space Treaty) toward a more fatalistic nationalism.14 This shift has been led by the
United States, beginning with the second Bush Administration, when
neoconservatives who subscribed to an outlook of political realism were setting a
policy of space domination.15 The Obama Administration returned American space
policy to global cooperation, only to be reversed by the Trump Administration, which
has called for space superiority and even a branch of the military dedicated to the
purpose.16 In light of this shift, new treaties seem ever more difficult.17
Part II of this Note examines the background of human activity in outer space and
the treaties that resulted from that history. It also discusses the various treaties that

11

See generally Bill Boothby, Space Weapons and the Law, 93 INT'L L. STUD. 179 (2017);
Michel Bourbonnière, National-Security Law in Outer Space: The Interface of Exploration and
Security, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (2005); Michel Bourbonnière & Ricky J. Lee, Legality of the
Deployment of Conventional Weapons in Earth Orbit: Balancing Space Law and the Law of
Armed Conflict, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 873 (2007); Alex B. Englehart, Common Ground in the Sky:
Extending the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to Reconcile U.S. and Chinese Security Interests, 17
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 133 (2008); Ryan Esparza, Event Horizon: Examining Military and
Weaponization Issues in Space by Utilizing the Outer Space Treaty and the Law of Armed
Conflict, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 333 (2018); Blair Stephenson Kuplic, The Weaponization of Outer
Space: Preventing an Extraterrestrial Arms Race, 39 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1123 (2014);
Andrew T. Park, Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for A New Way of
Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space, 28 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 871 (2006).
12 See Mitchell Ford, War on the Final Frontier: Can Twentieth-Century Space Law Combat
Twenty-First-Century Warfare?, 39 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 237 (2017); David A. Koplow, AsatIsfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1187 (2009); Jesse Oppenheim, Danger at 700,000 Feet: Why the United States Needs
to Develop A Kinetic Anti-Satellite Missile Technology Test-Ban Treaty, 38 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
761 (2013).
13

See generally Oppenheim, supra note 12.

14

See MOLTZ, supra note 5, at 23–31.

15

Id. at 26.

Ramin Skibba, How Trump’s ‘Space Force’ Could Set Off a Dangerous Arms Race,
POLITICO (June 28, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/06/22/how-trumpsspace-force-could-set-off-a-dangerous-arms-race-218888.
16

See MOLTZ, supra note 5, at 30 (“Bush administration policies after 2001, inspired by
concepts of space nationalism, explicitly rejected new treaty-based approaches.”). Moltz draws
out a spectrum of philosophies from conflict to cooperation, space nationalism to global
institutionalism, and from the more general extremes to the nuanced center of technological
determinism and social interactionism. Id. at 23–41.
17

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss1/9
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comprise the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC),18 including those addressing
environmental concerns in a military context.19 Part II also examines the various
ASAT technologies to better understand the results of their use. Part III discusses why
certain kinds of ASAT technology should already be forbidden by existing
international law established in the LOAC. Part III also examines the Outer Space
Treaty’s influence over ASAT law while examining WMD and other ambiguous terms
that have prevented straight-forward textual application of the treaty to prohibit ASAT
weapons. Finally, Part IV concludes by arguing that the stakes for limiting ASAT
weapons are ever-increasing as society’s dependence on an orbiting infrastructure
grows and private activity in space promises to expand in the future.
II. JOHNNY, DON’T TAKE YOUR GUNS TO SPACE: WEAPONS OF THE FINAL FRONTIER
AND THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THEM
Human endeavors in space intensified at the height of the Cold War.20 The entire
world was justifiably concerned about nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war,
not just the superpowers with nuclear arsenals.21 These concerns manifested in
technology for surveillance and detection of attacks, but also the weapons to counter
the new technology.22 Any talk of scientific exploration and discovery always took
place in the shadow of the Cold War.23 Humans reaching into outer space was a major
step in that war and international law responded.

18 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter PROTOCOL I]; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations].
19 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, art. I, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter
ENMOD].
20

The space age is said to start with the development of the V2 rocket in 1942. Colin S. Gray,
Series Editor’s Preface of EVERETT C. DOLMAN, ASTROPOLITIK: CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS IN THE
SPACE AGE xi, xi (2002).
21 The author denies having any WMDs, despite a popular meme. The meme is explained by
Josh Dance in a blog post. Josh Dance, Who Is Jeff and Why Does He Have Nuclear Weapons?,
MEDIUM.COM (Jan. 4, 2017), https://medium.com/@joshdance/who-is-jeff-and-why-does-hehave-nuclear-weapons-f823de764c5e.
22

See generally John Aubrey Douglass, The Cold War, Technology, and the American
University (UC Berkeley Research and Occasional Paper Series, 1999).
23 Non-military satellites were also used to set precedent for flyover rights and helped to
establish customary international law, which, then applied to military satellites. See DELBERT
A. TERRILL, JR., THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL OUTER SPACE LAW, Air
University Press (May 1999) 16 n.34 (“Eisenhower’s civilian [International Geophysical Year]
satellite was a ‘stalking horse’ to establish the precedent of ‘freedom in space’ for eventual
military reconnaissance satellites and focused attention on the former as a diversion from the
latter.”); see generally NEIL DEGRASS TYSON & AVIS LANG, ACCESSORY TO WAR (2018). Tyson
and Lang discuss the long history of scientific advancement depending on military funding and
research.
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A. The Outer Space Treaty
The USSR launched Sputnik I on October 4, 1957.24 Sputnik II, with Laika the
dog, was launched on November 3 of the same year.25 On January 31, 1958, the United
States launched Explorer I.26 These first steps in the space race spawned the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) from the United Nations
(U.N.) General Assembly in 1959, where proposals for treaties were modeled after the
Antarctica Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and customary international law.27 A
potential treaty that COPUOS would develop was meant to address the use of nuclear
weapons, the delineation of airspace from outer space reflecting potential claims of
sovereignty that affect flyover rights, and the appropriation of celestial bodies.28 The
U.N. General Assembly unanimously endorsed the Outer Space Treaty in December
1966.29
The Outer Space Treaty has been characterized as primarily an arms control treaty,
so the application to ASAT weapons is not unfounded.30 Article IV of the treaty
prohibits placing nuclear weapons and other WMDs into orbit and any weapons on
celestial bodies:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner.
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to
the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military

24

Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, NASA, https://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/ (last
updated Oct. 10, 2007).
25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M. Arons, Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. &
COM. 419, 422–24 (1967) [hereinafter Dembling: Evolution] (quoting the COPUOS report from
1959 in regard to the customary international law, “[C]ountries throughout the world proceeded
on the premise of the permissibility of . . . flight of the space vehicle . . . regardless of the
territory they ‘passed over’ during the course of their flight through outer space.”).
28 Id. The Paris Convention of 1919 and the Chicago Convention of 1944 “recognized the
exclusive sovereignty of states to the airspace above their territory” but never resolved how far
it extended. The absence of an upper limit meant state sovereignty could potentially extend
indefinitely and severely limit the use of outer space. TERRELL supra note 23, at 5. The cutoff
is still in dispute, though, for regulatory reasons regarding what agencies and laws will apply to
suborbital private space flight.
29

Dembling: Evolution, supra note 27, at 420.

30

FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW 454 (2d ed. 2018) (quoting L.B. Johnson,
‘Statement by the President Announcing the Reaching of Agreement on an Outer Space Treaty,
8 December 1966’, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Johnson 1966-II, Doc.
643, 1441 (U of Michigan Digital Library, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotus/): NY Times, 9
December 1966 at 1 col. 8 (“the most important arms control development since the Limited
Test Ban Treaty of 1963”).
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bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and
the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.
The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility
necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies
shall also not be prohibited. 31
The meaning of “weapon of mass destruction” was not defined or otherwise
explained in the text, which opens up the possibility of defining WMD in a manner
that includes certain ASAT weapons.32 The term WMD typically evokes nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons; however, the term need not be read so
narrowly, as discussed below in Section IV.
Note that the second paragraph of Article IV allowing use “exclusively for
peaceful purposes” and forbidding the testing of “any type of weapons” or engaging
in military maneuvers is limited to activities “on celestial bodies.”33 As a result, this
prohibition of weapons and maneuvers would not apply to ASAT weapons because
they are used in orbit and not on a celestial body.
The restriction to “on celestial bodies” of paragraph two is a narrow spatial
restriction that would not apply to all current uses and technology of ASAT weapons.34
However, other articles of the Outer Space Treaty will impact the legality of the use
and testing of ASATs. To start, Article I sets out that outer space should be “free for
exploration and use by all States” and that there should be “free access to all areas of
celestial bodies.”35 This article is a direct indictment of the debris resulting from the
use of a kinetic ASAT, by potentially restricting free access to space. Similarly, if a
state were allowed to remove or hinder a satellite belonging to another state, that
would interfere with the right of exploration and use. Article VII establishes
international liability for a launching State for damage caused by space objects or
component parts, which would certainly include debris from ASAT use.36 Notably,
this liability is applied on Earth, in air space, or in outer space.37 Liability is not
prohibition so much as disincentive, though. Article IX creates a duty to act with “due
regard” to not interfere with other States’ activities by imploring the State Parties to
“conduct exploration . . . so as to avoid . . . harmful contamination.”38 It seems some
nations mistakenly find it legal to create dangerous debris clouds that are certainly
contamination.
31

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. IV.

32

See Koplow, supra note 12, at 1198 n. 27.

33

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. IV.

34

Id.

35

Id. art. I.

36 Id. art. VII. See also Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 13810, that elaborated on art. VII [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
37 See Liability Convention, supra note 36. Liability for damage brought about by debris from
an ASAT weapon may work as a deterrence for collateral damage but does not speak to legality.
38

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. IX.
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The spirit of the Outer Space Treaty can certainly appear to be anti-ASAT.
Language such as “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries . . . [outer space]
shall be the province of all mankind”39 and “peaceful purposes”40 does not invoke
weapons or aggressive behavior of any kind. Then again, there are arguments that the
Outer Space Treaty is permissive of ASAT weapons.41 These arguments are based on
narrow definitions of WMD and “orbit,” which will be addressed in Section IV. The
Outer Space Treaty’s only article to mention weapons of any kind and WMDs,
specifically, is Article IV. If the limited discussion of weapons—and only then to
prohibit them—does not convince the reader of the peaceful spirit of the treaty or
leaves the treatment of weapons ambiguous, the Outer Space Treaty brings
reinforcements in Article III.
B. The Law of Armed Conflict
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty incorporates international law into the realm
of outer space.42 The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is a substantial part of the body
of international law, incorporating several treaties and conventions into a
comprehensive law of war (sometimes called international humanitarian law) that
covers weapons, combatants, and non-combatants. The LOAC does not make war
illegal but seeks to limit the damage and suffering.43
The general principle of limiting warfare stems from the Regulations Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907 Hague Regulations), which state that a
warring party’s right “to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”44 The
Geneva Conventions expanded protections for civilians and non-combatants, most
importantly for the purposes of this Note in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).45 These expanded protections start with
the basic rule that “the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.”46 The satellite infrastructure in orbit is a mix of civilian and military
39

Id. art. I.

40

Id. Preamble.

41 See Boothby, supra note 11 at 202–03 (discussing Bourbonniere and Lee’s article, supra
note 11, that distinguishes conventional weapons from weapons of mass destruction).
42

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. III.

43 “There are two complementary components of humanitarian law, the jus ad bellum, which
some view as a separate body of law altogether, and the jus in bello. The former sets forth the
criteria for the use of force as an instrument of national policy, asking when a State may use
force. The jus in bello, by contrast, addresses how force may be used in an armed conflict,
regardless of the propriety of the decision to resort to it.” Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of
Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 145 (1999).
44

1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 18, art. 22.

45

Protocol I, supra note 18.

46

Id. art. 48.
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objects.47 The targeting and effects of ASAT weapons, then, would be governed by
Protocol I.
Protocol I prohibits indiscriminate attacks where the target is unable to be
distinguished as military or civilian or the ability to hit the intended target renders the
distinction moot.48 But indiscriminate is also considered a means or method where the
effects cannot be limited to military objectives.49 Any weapon that may hit its intended
target but may also affect civilians or civilian objects could be considered
indiscriminate. The prohibition is not barring any collateral damage or effect on
civilians and civilian objects; only effects that are “excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated.”50 Excessive effect is not defined, nor is
direct military advantage, which provides some leeway for judgment.
Allowing reasonable effect to civilian objects is further complicated by the
definition of civilian and military objects. Protocol I limits the protections to civilian
objects by defining a military object as “objects which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage.”51 It is presumed that dual use satellites or even
civilian satellites the military utilizes as consumers could be classified as military
objects.
An important part of Protocol I in relation to space is a rather weak reference to
environmental damage stating that “[c]are shall be taken in warfare to protect the
natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage.”52 The
environment plays a key role because orbits and outer space are considered part of the
environment.53 Also, by way of customary international law, the environment is
considered a civilian object (as opposed to military).54 Wrecking the environment of
earth orbit with persistent debris from ASAT weapons is an excessive effect on a
civilian object.
The environment is addressed in other documents as well. The Convention On The
Prohibition Of Military Or Any Hostile Use Of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD) from 1977 takes a slightly stronger stance than Protocol I, but
not by much.55 Article I of ENMOD requires parties to “undertake” to not engage in
47 TYSON & LANG, supra note 23, at 159 (“Most satellites, in fact, are ‘dual use.’ And if, as
Joan Johnson-Freese of the US Naval War College points out, dual use covers both
civilian/military and defensive/offensive uses, then ‘space technology is at least 95% dual use.’”
(citation omitted)).
48

Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 51(4).

49

Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 51(4)(c).

50

Id. art. 51(5)(b).

51

Id. art. 52(2).

52

Id. art 55(1). The U.S. has not accepted this provision, see Boothby, supra note 11, at 190
n. 37.
53 Brian D. Green, Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing: Safety Tool or Security
Threat?, 75 A.F. L. REV. 39, 47 (2016).
54

Boothby, supra note 11, at 190.

55

ENMOD, supra note 19, art. I.
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environmental modification techniques that “create widespread, longlasting [sic] or
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.”56
Protocol I asks to take care to avoid environmental damage as indiscriminate, while
ENMOD tries to not have such damage be a deliberate means of injuring the enemy.
In addition, the U.N.’s Space Debris Guidelines also speak directly to the space
environment, but state explicitly that the Guidelines are not legally binding.57 Between
the LOAC, ENMOD, and the U.N.’s Space Debris Guidelines, the environment of
space should be protected against the likes of debris-causing ASAT weapons.
Finally, the U.N. Charter reigns supreme over all other international obligations.58
It starts with the goal of “international peace and security,”59 while allowing for the
“inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.”60 Amid the Outer Space
Treaty, Protocol I, ENMOD, and the U.N. Charter, there are no definitive or explicit
prohibitions on ASAT weapons, or any weapons in space besides WMDs, if used for
self-defense with proper proportionality and discrimination. The issues with ASAT
weapons are proportionality, discrimination, and, arguably, self-defense, especially
when testing such weapons. Live testing of ASAT weapons offers no distinct military
advantage because there is no adversary or hostilities, but still affects the civilian
object of the space environment.61
C. Anti-Satellite Weapons
Tom Wilson, a member of the Federation of American Scientists’ Space
Commission, categorized ASAT weapons in a report for their Space Policy Project. 62
The most obvious category of ASAT weapons are kinetic weapons, also known as
intercept weapons.63 Kinetic weapons propel objects or explosives toward a satellite
to destroy or damage it.64 A kinetic ASAT weapon could be a missile, a swarm of
microsatellites, or simply fragments of non-maneuvering objects – essentially,
intentional space debris – that can still cause catastrophic damage.65 The likely result
of most of these weapons is destruction of the satellite, which in turn could create

56

Id.

57

UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, SPACE DEBRIS
MITIGATION GUIDELINES OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE 2 (2010),
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf.
58

U.N. Charter art. 103.

59

Id. art. 1, 1.

60

Id. art. 51.

61 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE 35 (2019) (stating
one-third of all orbital debris is attributed to a satellite collision and a disastrous ASAT weapon
test by China in 2007).
62 TOM WILSON, THREATS TO UNITED STATES SPACE CAPABILITIES sec. IV (2001),
https://fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html.
63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.
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more debris. 66 From the aggressor’s perspective, the good news is that the satellite is
no longer a threat or helpful to an adversary. The bad news is that the effects of that
victory can linger indefinitely and continue to cause damage indiscriminately to assets
in orbit, some of which, ironically, may belong to the aggressor.
Wilson categorizes some types of ASAT as “stand-off” weapons, meaning they
maintain a further distance than the intercept weapons.67 These types of weapons are
usually transmitting energy to the target to either dazzle the sensors temporarily or
damage the electronics of the target to some degree.68 Stand-off ASAT weapons would
not produce as much space debris, beyond perhaps rendering the target satellite
unresponsive and out of control.
Another type of ASAT weapon does not need to interact with the satellite in a
physical way. Jamming or spoofing the signals travelling to or from the satellite or
hacking the earth-bound computer systems running the satellite would be effective in
disabling the satellite.69 In the vast majority of circumstances where this kind of attack
would be used, the effects could be temporary and leave the satellite undisturbed in its
orbit.70
The effects of ASAT weapons can vary depending on where one looks. When
looking in orbit, the biggest effect is debris and the growing danger of space junk.
Looking at the receiving end of a signal, the loss of the satellites’ functionality will be
felt by militaries and civilians alike that depend on the lost functions. Computer
systems control much of our infrastructure and economy.71 Those systems rely on
space assets, like the precision timing and location functions of global positioning
systems (GPS).72 The chain reaction of systems failing to function properly would be
widespread and persistent. For instance, if communication infrastructure is reduced,
other emergencies become more difficult to manage and could threaten lives.
Emergencies could arise from components of utility infrastructure losing contact or
the timing of events and systems failing from a GPS constellation reduction. There is
also a high probability of political action if foul play is suspected. If a satellite is
destroyed, redundancy is limited and the time to build and launch a replacement can
stretch into years or decades.73 There is little doubt that such failure would result in a
66

See Larsen, supra note 8.

67

WILSON, supra note 62, sec. IV.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70 There is the potential, theoretically, to maneuver the satellite via system hacking, and
likewise to inhibit the maneuvering control via interference or jamming which could lead to
collisions, turning the satellite itself into uncontrolled debris.
71 See generally FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS
SECURITY, https://www.fcc.gov/general/critical-infrastructure-and-communications-security.
72
Richard Hollingham, What Would Happen If All Satellites Stopped Working?, BBC FUTURE
(June 9, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130609-the-day-without-satellites;
Dartnell, supra note 2.
73 George Dvorsky, What Would Happen If All Our Satellites Were Suddenly Destroyed,
GIZMODO (June 4, 2015), https://io9.gizmodo.com/what-would-happen-if-all-our-satelliteswere-suddenly-d-1709006681. Dvorsky points out that not only does it take time and money to
rebuild and relaunch a satellite, but the orbit it needs to be placed in is now full of a debris field.
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death toll from food shortages stemming from reduced agricultural production,
accidents, or reduced capacity to predict and manage natural disasters.74 The societal
tolls could ripple outward from failing transportation to devastating hits to global
economies and massive power outages. If satellites were destroyed or impaired
purposefully, the diplomatic repercussions and retaliations may be much more
devastating than the loss of the satellites’ utility.75
III. THE DISCRIMINATING LAWS OF WAR EXTEND TO OUTER SPACE
When China used an ASAT weapon to destroy a defunct satellite in 2007, followed
by the United States doing the same in 2008,76 attempts to formalize agreements
pertaining to ASAT weapons had been hindered for a decade by the United States.77
In light of the lack of willingness to discuss restricting ASAT weapons, examining
their legality under current law may help to move parties closer to restricting uses of
weapons in outer space more formally. The following analysis will look at the
indiscriminate nature and the environmental effects of kinetic ASAT weapons in
relation to current international law, including the LOAC and the U.N. Charter.
A. ASATs Are Indiscriminate Weapons
The Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I deems a weapon to be
“indiscriminate,” and therefore prohibited, in two situations.78 First, a weapon is
indiscriminate if the weapon is unable to discriminate between targets, especially
between civilian and military targets.79 This means the weapon is not able to be aimed
precisely enough to distinguish targets if civilian and military objects are in close
proximity. Second, a weapon is deemed indiscriminate if the secondary effects of the
weapon having hit the intended target, such as gas clouds or shrapnel after the initial
impact, can harm civilian as well as military objects or personnel.80 When a kinetic
ASAT weapon is used, the effects of the weapons are three-fold: the destruction of the
target satellite, the consequential damage potentially caused by the debris cloud, and

74

Id.

75

See FORREST E. MORGAN, DETERRENCE AND FIRST-STRIKE STABILITY IN SPACE (2010).

76

available

Spacesecurity.org, Space Security 2008, at 29–30 (2008),
http://spacesecurityindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/SSI2008.pdf.

at

77 U.N.-affiliated Conference on Disarmament (CD) participants refer to “PAROS” (or
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) which the U.N. General Assembly passes a
resolution from annually. “U.S. opposition has effectively spiked all meaningful consideration
of the subject.” Koplow, supra note 12, at 1216–19. See also TERRILL, supra note 23, at 19
(describing generally the U.S. Air Force resistance to the development of international
conventions).
78 Schmitt, supra note 43, at 147 (“such weapons are incapable of afflicting only combatants
and difficult to control”); Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 51.4(b-c).
79 Schmitt, supra note 43, at 147. See also Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa
Treaty), Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
80

Schmitt, supra note 43, at 147.
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the effect on the users of the target or collaterally damaged satellites. The nature of
these effects renders the use of kinetic ASAT weapons illegal under Protocol I.
1. Indiscriminate Effect on the Environment
The state of the technology of ASAT targeting makes the actual target discernable.
In outer space, there are not enough objects in close proximity to risk missing the
target only to hit something unintended.81 Rather, indiscrimination falls under the
second situation discussed above, when the targeting is successful and results in the
compromise of structural integrity of the satellite (it blows apart).82 Pieces of a satellite
that has been successfully targeted by a kinetic ASAT weapon will travel in all
directions at hyper-velocities. It is the nature of this debris and the inability to control
its effects that are the indiscriminate nature of an ASAT weapon.83
One can recall from basic physics that even a tiny mass can carry tremendous force
when traveling at extremely high speeds.84 If flecks of dried paint can cause damage
when travelling at hyper-velocities,85 larger pieces of debris from a destroyed satellite
would be fatal to other space objects. While missing the original target is unlikely to
result in the accidental destruction of a civilian satellite, the successful destruction of
a satellite could indiscriminately threaten civilian satellites with the resultant debris.
The environment itself is a civilian object under international law,86 and has
become a sort of global commons in recent decades.87 Extending the environment to
include outer space was a natural next step.88 The consequences of this designation are
81 See id. at 148 (discussing SCUD missile use in the open desert compared with use in Israeli
cities).
82 Kinetic ASAT weapons would obviously result in blowing up the target satellite but
directed energy ASAT weapons could also affect the integrity of the target satellite resulting in
the explosion-like effect of blowing apart. See Laura Grego, Union of Concerned Scientists, A
History of Anti-Satellite Programs (Jan. 2012).
83 A debris cloud from an exploded satellite could be compared to a cloud of gas from a
chemical or biological weapon. See Koplow, supra note 12, at 1245.
84

Where force is equal to the mass of the object multiplied by the acceleration (the
acceleration from a collision would be the rapid slowing of the object from impact). Even a
small mass has a large force when the acceleration is so high. To understand the force of debris,
compare the velocity of one of the fastest bullets on the market, which moves at the speed of
4,145 feet per second, with the speed of a piece of space debris traveling faster than 25,666 feet
per second. Chris Bond, Modern Rifle Cartridges Keep Getting Faster and Faster, But Which
Are the Fastest?, WIDEOPENSPACES (Nov. 29, 2014), https://www.wideopenspaces.com/8cartridges-highest-fps-speed-pics/; Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, NASA (Sept. 26,
2013), https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html.
85 Koplow, supra note 12, at 1202 (“[T]he windows of the Space Shuttle, designed to
withstand the enormous pressures of re-entry into the earth's atmosphere, have repeatedly been
pockmarked by collisions with tiny flecks of dried paint and other minor objects, traveling at
ten times the speed of a high-powered bullet.”).
86

See Boothby, supra note 11, at 190.

“The notion that the entire globe should be common and within the domain of politics has
been uncritically adopted by the international environmental community.” David A. Westbrook,
Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 655 (1994).
87

88

Alexander William Salter, Space Debris: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Orbital
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two-fold: the effect of indiscriminate weapons on the environment as a civilian rather
than a military object and the obligations under non-weapon treaties to protect the
environment all extend into outer space where ASAT technologies would be used.89
As discussed above, the concept of discrimination in targeting and use of weapons
includes the initial intended target and the aftermath of the use of the weapon. If a
precise hit to a military satellite creates a dangerous debris field, the orbits the debris
occupies are inherently civilian objects that are damaged by the use of the weapon.
Like radioactivity from fallout of a nuclear weapon, the debris will linger for years
turning that particular orbit into an unusable casualty of “scorched earth.” The debris
aftermath would render the proportionality calculation heavily away from legality
under Protocol I, the sort of indiscriminate collateral damage to civilian objects – as
outer space is considered – that Protocol I was trying to prevent.
Article I of The Convention On The Prohibition Of Military Or Any Hostile Use
Of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) reinforces the illegality of the
creation of debris fields in orbit because Article II explicitly extends the environment
not to be altered to outer space.90 The littering of orbits in outer space alters the ability
to occupy and use the orbits. A debris-strewn orbit would be a modification of the
utility of that orbit and thus a modification of the natural environment that ENMOD
prohibits. Modification of that orbit also hinders the free access guaranteed by the
Outer Space Treaty as discussed below in Section IV.
The space environment was a factor in the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of
1963 (LTBT) that stopped the testing of nuclear weapons in the high atmosphere and
space.91 It can be argued that nuclear arms control benefitted from space technology
by providing means of verifying compliance as much as space technology benefitted
from not having space be a nuclear wasteland.92 Nuclear tests in the upper atmosphere
and in space93 were endangering other missions and could hinder the use of
reconnaissance satellites, manned space flight, and other technologies, like GPS, from
being developed.94 What James Clay Moltz argues in The Politics of Space Security is
that the LTBT was essentially an environmental treaty.95 This is reflected in the
Commons, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221, 227 (2016) (“[T]he problems associated with space
debris arise because access to orbit--getting a spacecraft from launch to its intended orbit--and
the orbits themselves are public goods.”).
89

See generally Kristina Schiavone, The Adaptation of the Precautionary Principle of
Environmental Law to Outer Space: The Mitigation of Space Debris (Feb. 12, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
90 ENMOD,

supra note 19, art. I–II.

91 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space & Under Water,
Oct. 10, 1963, T.I.A.S. No. 5433 [hereinafter Limited Test Ban Treaty].
92

MOLTZ, supra note 5, at 45. Space technology also helps with many treaties by using
reconnaissance satellites to verify compliance.
93 Id. at 47 (“[L]ess than a year passed between Sputnik’s orbit in 1957 and the U.S. testing of
three nuclear weapons in space in the summer 1958.”).
94

Id. at 46.

95 Id. at 62. This leaves us with a treaty limiting arms as an environmental treaty and a treaty
establishing laws for an environment – outer space in the Outer Space Treaty – being considered
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preamble and Article I of the treaty, “to achieve the discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time . . . and desiring to put an end to the
contamination of mans [sic] environment by radioactive substances . . . the Parties to
this Treaty undertake to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon
test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or
control . . . in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water,
including territorial waters or high seas.”96
2. Indiscriminate Effects of Collateral Damage
When a piece of the orbiting infrastructure is targeted by an ASAT weapon, the
destruction of the targeted satellite will certainly affect a military’s ability to function,
potentially making it legal under Protocol I. But there is a remaining question of
possible effects on civilian uses of destroyed space infrastructure. Destruction of
civilian infrastructure will come about in two ways: (1) the initial destruction of a
dedicated civilian satellite or a dual-use satellite by an ASAT weapon and (2) the
subsequent damage to a dedicated civilian satellite, or a dual-use satellite, by the debris
created by the destruction of the initially targeted satellite.97
Protocol I leaves room for a balancing of proportionality of military advantage to
potential civilian harm.98 Civilians and civilian targets can be liberally interpreted as
military targets if contributing to the war effort in any way.99 If the military contracts
commercial communication bandwidths or other uses, the line blurs between military
and civilian objects in outer space, skewing the proportionality balancing.100 Directly
targeting a commercial satellite being used by the military could potentially be
justified if the effects are deemed proportionate and reasonable.
For a target to be deemed proportional, one cannot ignore the effect on civilian
populations. Any calculation of proportionality must look beyond the hardware of the
satellite destroyed to the rippling effects on the civilians reliant on the hardware. For
instance, if a missile destroys a dam, the loss of the structure would factor, but so too
should harm that results from any flooding or lost power as a result of the loss of the
dam. Similarly, the actual results of the destruction of a satellite, in its immediate
environment, are a factor, but so too should be the effects of its lost utility downstream
in the data flow. Like modern militaries, society has integrated space technology into
the infrastructure to such a degree that it has become quite reliant.101 The
disappearance of that infrastructure would be devastating and long-lasting. The
an arms control treaty.
96

Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 91, at Preamble & art. I.

97 See Allen Thomson, Civil Satellite Vulnerability, SPACE NEWS (Feb. 20–26, 1995),
https://fas.org/spp/eprint/civilsat.htm.
98

Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 51(5)(b).

99

Schmitt, supra note 43, at 149–50.

100

Koplow, supra note 12, at 1245 n.189.

101See

Satellite Outage Felt by Millions, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 21, 1998),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1998-05-21-9805210138-story.html (citing the
many issues from the temporary outage of a single communications satellite with technology
that is now 20 years old. Technological dependence has grown exponentially in the past 20
years.).
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destruction of a single satellite in an array or system of satellites may not always reach
the level of catastrophic, but even a single military satellite’s debris could
indiscriminately collide with one or more civilian satellites that would affect millions
of end-users.
The determination of proportionality required to make the weapon legal under
Protocol I should be a difficult one to reach, otherwise the purpose of Protocol I to
protect civilians would be compromised. Article 51, paragraph 5, section (b) describes
the cutoff as “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”102 This subsection is referring to effects on civilians as a result of the
direct targeting. Paragraph 4, section (c), though, addresses the post-targeting effects
on civilians, stating that indiscriminate attacks are “[t]hose which employ a method or
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this
Protocol.”103 Both provisions implicate kinetic, debris-causing ASAT weapons.
If the case against kinetic ASAT weapons being legal seems iron-clad based on
collateral damage, the integration of civilian and military uses in single satellites and
military use of civilian satellites rusts the iron into potential ineffectiveness.
Arguments exist that dual-use satellites are using the civilians as a shield,104 which is
illegal under Protocol I.105 When taken together, the two arguments – proportional or
illegal – result in the need for a more definitive international understanding on the use
of ASAT weapons if the international community wants to safeguard access to space
for expanding commercial and scientific endeavors. While solid arguments can be
made for illegality, they still might be too precarious to stake the future of human
space activity on.
3. The Outer Space Treaty Is a Lever in Search of a Fulcrum.106
The strongest argument against ASAT weapons is found in the Outer Space Treaty.
A vast majority of States have signed the Outer Space Treaty, unlike many of the
treaties relating to the LOAC or the environment.107 David A. Koplow, Professor of
National Security Law at Georgetown University, makes a strong case for customary
international law in his paper “Asat-Isfaction: Customary International Law and the
Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons,”108 but he also points out that the United States
has consistently objected to many of the resolutions proposed, in order to preserve the
U.S. status as a persistent objector outside of the customary international law where a
failure to object can mean consent.109 The wide acceptance and focus on the interests
102

Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 51(5)(b).

103

Id. art. 51(4)(c).

Abdul Rehman Khan, Space Wars: Dual Use Satellites, 14 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y.
314, 334–35 (2017).
104

105

Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 51(7).

“Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to place it, and I shall move the
world.” Archimedes
106

107

See Koplow, supra note 12, at 1199.

108

See id. at 1265–66.

109

Id. at 1269.
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of all nations in the Outer Space Treaty make it the strongest argument for the
limitation of ASAT weapons.
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty tells States to use space with “due regard for
the corresponding interests of other States” that are parties to the Treaty.110 Such
“corresponding interests” include access to space as stated in Article I: “Outer Space
. . . shall be free for exploration and use by all States.”111 Space debris can effectively
limit access to space by preventing a space object from achieving orbit lest it risk
destruction by passing debris. It can also damage or destroy objects already in space
by colliding with them. Any of these collisions, in turn, will likely cause more debris
that further inhibit access to space. Article IX also tells States to avoid contamination
of space.112 Any use of space that indiscriminately creates debris, especially the
amount of debris resulting from the use of an ASAT weapon, runs afoul of this article
of the Outer Space Treaty.
The Outer Space Treaty has, thus far, not prevented the development or testing of
ASAT weapons, nor has other international law, in spite of statements against the
weapons’ legality from other space-faring nations.113 The spirit of the Outer Space
Treaty makes the best lever for moving legal opinion into the realm of sensible
restriction. What is missing is a fulcrum on which to place this lever in order to ease
the work of effectively addressing ASAT weapons and avoiding an outer space arms
race.114 Until another agreement or treaty is made, the most applicable fulcrum is
found in the specific language of the Outer Space Treaty itself.
B. WMD, Definitely a Definition Problem
The strongest argument for the illegality of ASAT weapons is based on the plain
language of the Outer Space Treaty and leveraging the language of Article IV. Article
IV states:

110Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. IX. Article IX was spawned from Project West Ford
wherein the United States deployed tons of metal strips to orbit in an attempt to bounce
communication signals off of them. The project was opposed stridently by astronomers and
other scientists from all over the world, prompting the agreement to consult and share data from
the experiment to determine the effect on other nations and their scientific endeavors. TERRILL,
supra note 23, at 67.
111

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. I.

112

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. IX.

In response to China’s January 2007 ASAT weapon test, many nations condemned the act.
Japan accused China of violating the Outer Space Treaty, and India, supposedly, had previously
refrained from testing ASAT weapons of its own for legal reasons. Carin Zissis, China’s AntiSatellite Test, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, BACKGROUNDER (Feb. 22, 2007),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-anti-satellite-test.
113

114See Michael Sheetz & Amanda Macias, China and Russia Are Militarizing Space With
'Energy Weapons' and Anti-Satellite Missiles: Pentagon, CNBC (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/pentagon-warns-of-weaponization-of-space-by-chinarussia-report.html (reporting that the arms race is likely already in progress); see also Amitabh
Sinha & Johnson T.A., Shooting Down Live Satellite, India Enters Strategic Space,
INDIAEXPRESS (Mar. 28, 2019), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/shooting-down-livesatellite-india-enters-strategic-space-5646177/ (reporting a recent test of a kinetic ASAT
weapon by India on March 27, 2019 signaling a potential arms race aimed at space resources).
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States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth
any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons
in outer space in any other manner.115
Illegality through Article IV hinges on ASAT weapons being considered weapons
of mass destruction, as well as defining “place in orbit.” Some argue that “weapon of
mass destruction” is not a defined term, but rather an idea.116 The phrase had grown
and evolved over time before it was drilled into the world’s psyche in the runup to the
invasion of Iraq by President George W. Bush. The ambiguous claim that Iraq had and
used WMDs was used as a justification for the invasion and was carpeting the news
reports and briefings.117 The use of the term was meant as a metonym118 to stand in
for nuclear and other highly destructive weapons without having to identify them
specifically. For this reason, the definition of WMD is clouded with a lack of specifics
in order to enable the term to be effectively used with the preferred connotation of the
user.119 Today, the term is synonymous with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
weapons, but that was not always the case.
1. Bringing “Weapons of Mass Destruction” into Existence
The term “weapons of mass destruction” is considered to have been coined in 1937
by the Archbishop of Canterbury.120 At that time, he was not referring to nuclear or
chemical or even biological weapons. Rather, he was referring to the aerial
bombardment, with conventional bombs, of population centers by the Spanish Fascists
and Japanese.121 The phrase was first used in the diplomatic arena in November 1945
in a declaration from the U.S., Canada, and Britain, though not in its final form; it took
115

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. IV.

116

Ido Oren & Ty Solomon, WMD: The Career of a Concept, NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE, 35:1,
109, 111 (2013) (dispelling “the illusion that ‘WMD’ has a stable, unambiguous, essential
meaning”).
117

Id. at 109.

Id. at 111 n.11 (“[A] figure of speech that involves using one signified to stand for another
signified which is . . . closely associated with it in some way, notably the substitution of effect
[purported mass destruction] for cause [e.g., nuclear explosion; chemical reaction].”).
118

119 Id. at 126 (citing President Clinton’s use of rhetoric to classify semi-automatic rifles as
WMD for the assault weapons ban).

Id. at 112; W. Seth Carus, Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Occasional Paper,
No. 8, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 6–7 (2012) (quoting “the
December 1937 Christmas address on ‘Christian Responsibility’ delivered by the Archbishop
of Canterbury, William Cosmo Gordon Lang: ‘Take, for example, the question of peace. Who
can think without dismay of the fears, jealousies, and suspicions which have compelled nations,
our own among them, to pile up their armaments? Who can think at this present time without a
sickening of the heart of the appalling slaughter, the suffering, the manifold misery brought by
war to Spain and to China? Who can think without horror of what another widespread war would
mean, waged as it would be with all the new weapons of mass destruction?’”).
120

121

Carus argues he was referencing, at least in part, chemical weapons, but Carus does not
imply he was referring solely to chemical weapons. Carus, supra note 120, at 7.
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the New York Times’ translation and commentary to put it together.122 The declaration
was the precursor to a U.N. resolution regarding arms control, which also established
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). When negotiating the resolution, discussion
of atomic weapon controls was obvious, but arguments over “other weapons of mass
destruction” language were strongly debated.123 Over the years, various negotiations
proposed classifying conventional weapons such as jets, bombers, and battleships as
WMDs, as well as any weapon in-between up to nuclear weapons.124
Around the time of the Outer Space Treaty’s drafting, the phrase “weapons of mass
destruction,” in the context of Article IV, saw various iterations.125 The negotiations
settled on specifically naming nuclear weapons and including other weapons of mass
destruction.126 A broader conception of WMD, beyond nuclear weapons, is reflected
in a statement by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance, during the Senate
ratification hearing for the Outer Space Treaty, in which he defined WMD as,
“chemical and biological weapons . . . or any weapon which might be developed in
the future which would have the capability of mass destruction such as that which
would be wreaked by nuclear weapons.”127 With the exception of referring to future
weapons with destructive effects similar to chemical and biological as well as nuclear,
this is, incidentally, the definition espoused by the Commission on Conventional
Armaments, a U.N. commission created to act alongside the Atomic Energy
Commission.128
In order to evaluate other weapons’ destructive effects, compared to NBC
weapons, it is required to evaluate the effects of the NBC weapons, not the means of
destruction. Is the destructive effect that qualifies a weapon as a WMD the physical
damage to infrastructure, the lasting effects to the environment, or simply the toll in
human lives? Chemical and biological weapons affect living things like humans and
animals, but also the vegetation and other environmental components.129 They are not
known for the plain destructive effect of a large blast, though. Simply looking at lives

Oren & Solomon, supra note 116, at 113 (explaining N.Y. Times reporter Arthur Krock’s
report translated “atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”
into weapons of mass destruction).
122

123

Id. at 115–16.

124 Id. at 114–17. More recently, domestic U.S. law has defined a WMD very broadly in 18
U.S.C. § 2332a in conjunction with the definition of a destructive device in 18 U.S.C. § 921.
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lost and lasting environmental damage would be enough to compare other weapons
against.
Nuclear weapons combine the effects of chemical and biological weapons and add
the physical power of an immense blast of heat and pressure.130 Only comparing the
physical blast of a nuclear warhead will not define many other weapons as massively
destructive. But nuclear weapons also act like a chemical or a biological weapon in
their aftermath due to radioactive fallout.131 Radioactivity is a poison that continues to
kill long after the blast is gone.132 Radioactive material also travels with the wind and
can spread over large areas in an environmental disaster that pollutes water and soil
for decades.133 Without accounting for lives lost, the devastation of a nuclear weapon,
like chemical and biological weapons, has the longest effect by poisoning the
environment.134
The scale of lethality of a weapon is a concrete way to easily classify it as a weapon
of mass destruction, but it should not be the only criteria. Environmental effects last
much longer and can be just as lethal and costly for a time beyond the initial impact.
Like radioactive fallout or the environmental devastation of Agent Orange, a weapon
that has such widespread and long-lasting effect on an environment can be considered
a weapon of mass destruction.
2. Plain Meaning Is the Correct Meaning
The Vienna Convention emphasizes plain meaning of the final text and limits the
use of legislative history, or traveuax preparatoires, leading to the drafting of the
treaty.135 When interpreting “weapons of mass destruction,” the plain meaning of the
term should look beyond the means of the destruction and look at the scale of the
destruction, as is suggested by the use of the qualifier “mass” in “mass destruction”.
3. What Is a Weapon of Mass Destruction?
The plain meaning of weapons of mass destruction starts with a weapon. Even the
obvious missile can look like common transportation in the outer space environment.
Is anything that can be used aggressively against another a weapon, or does a weapon
have to have the explicit purpose of being a weapon? In previous efforts to create an
ASAT weapon treaty, negotiations broke down over defining the space shuttle as an
ASAT weapon.136 The primary purpose of the space shuttle was not to be a weapon,
but it easily could snatch a satellite out of orbit, as it did with the Hubble Space
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Telescope.137 Performing sophisticated on-orbit activities with benign satellites can
draw suspicion of ASAT testing and development.138 Even future technologies such
as those developed to mitigate the current debris crisis or servicing satellites can draw
suspicion.139 In the interest of not classifying every space object as a weapon, the plain
meaning of a weapon would lean toward only objects that were designed with that
specific intent and objective.
Furthermore, what is a space weapon? A common definition has three categories:
(1) a weapon that starts in space to target a space object; (2) a weapon that starts in
space to target a ground object; and (3) a weapon that starts on the ground (or in the
air) and targets a space object.140 Attempting to define a space weapon more narrowly
collides quickly with trying to define where space starts. For ASAT weapons, the
object is pretty clearly in outer space, but where is the ASAT launched from? If there
were to be an anti-ASAT treaty or agreement, this question may be critical. For the
purposes of this Note, it is not, as this Note looks at the effects of the weapon on the
target in outer space beyond any reasonable delineation, not the origin of the weapon.
Oxford English Dictionary defines “mass” used as an adjective as “[i]nvolving or
affecting large numbers of people or things.”141 Therefore, mass destruction plainly
means destruction or damaging effects that are widespread, affecting large numbers.
The mass of mass destruction would not likely mean simply the gravity or the degree
of the destruction – if a single object is completely destroyed or only partially, for
instance. A definition that could be so limited in scope could easily include handguns
or even knives capable of taking a life, arguably a complete destruction in terms of
gravity of damage. By interpreting the phrase as being wide in scope and extent, the
definition would fall into line with past uses, such as massive aerial bombings or NBC
weapons.142
Lastly, what is destruction referring to? A loss of human life? Property damage?
Loss of critical infrastructure? Nuclear weapons bring all the destruction. The damage
from chemical weapons can be limited to the environment and property. For example,
Agent Orange was meant to kill vegetation.143 The crippling of infrastructure may not
take human lives immediately, but can become deadlier the longer and more farreaching the damage. Likewise, radiological weapons could potentially not take a
single life when detonated, but could contaminate the environment and eventually take
lives after some time. For a weapon to be considered a WMD, the destruction does not
137
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have to be only in human lives, but could be property, infrastructure, or environment
which could harm or end human lives in the long-term.144
4. ASATs Are Massively Destructive Weapons
The majority of ASAT technology would easily qualify as a weapon, being made
for the purpose of being a weapon. In some instances, a particularly maneuverable
satellite with some other primary purpose could potentially be used as a kinetic kill
ASAT weapon when placed on a collision course, but the kind of investment needed
to place useful satellites in orbit would likely prevent such use. There should be no
good arguments for classifying a dual-use satellite as a weapon.
ASAT weapons are massively destructive. The immediate results of a successful
ASAT deployment are not likely to cost any human lives. Though, as more humans
begin to enter space in a private capacity, the likelihood of casualties will go up. 145 In
the longer run, the environmental effects of an ASAT are more devastating than
environmental effects on Earth. The environment of outer space is dangerous without
contamination from successfully deployed ASAT weapons; when fields of high-speed
debris are added, the danger is multiplied many-fold.
The environmental effects of an ASAT weapon rival – and perhaps outrange – the
effects of a nuclear weapon. Unless the debris is in a low enough orbit where it will
eventually slow and reenter the atmosphere, there is little hope of mitigation.146 Inert
debris does not have a half-life. So long as the debris is present, it can continue to
cause damage, some catastrophic, for decades and perhaps indefinitely.
C. Just Passing Through or Staying in Orbit?
The final piece of text remaining in Article IV that could prevent application to
ASAT weapons is distinguishing what “placing in orbit” means. Article IV prohibits
“plac[ing] in orbit around the Earth any object carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kind of weapons of mass destruction.”147 Like defining where space starts, one can
take a positional or functional approach to defining orbit. Functionally, this can be
read to mean placed on a trajectory to orbit the earth at least temporarily, which would
preclude a direct intercept with no intention of orbit. The spatial approach would look
at the position in outer space more than intention of completing revolutions. Article
IV also prohibits, “station[ing] such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”
This clause implies a functional approach that would be redundant with a functional
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approach to “plac[ing] in orbit.” To avoid redundancy, we should interpret orbit
spatially.
The spatial approach is also more consistent with current practice. Everett C.
Dolman defines orbit in his book Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age
as “the path of a spacecraft or satellite caught in the grip of gravity.” 148 The path
Dolman describes could be seen as simply an altitude where the object orbits, like a
road with a particular location. One need not travel the road to be on or in the road. If
the possibility of revolutions was required to define an orbit, then geosynchronous
satellites that don’t change their position over the earth could arguably not be in orbit.
These satellites reach their altitude and maintain a horizontal velocity to match the
rotation velocity of the earth, but do not complete a revolution from the point of view
of the earth.149 An ASAT launched to an altitude of an orbiting satellite has achieved
the positioning the same as a geosynchronous satellite, but would stay in that position
a significantly shorter time. Would the ASAT be required to achieve some horizontal
velocity to be considered in orbit? That would be counter to the definition just defined.
The treaty language reflects the desire to not ensnare intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) that would pass through space for a short period before descending
to its target.150 But the altitude some ICBMs reach is higher than some satellites around
1000 km.151 Furthermore, the idea of an arms control treaty, as the Outer Space Treaty
has been called, allowing ICBMs carrying nuclear warheads under Article IV, when
Article III imports the U.N. Charter and other international law that make nuclear
warheads illegal, is disingenuous.152
D. Peacefully Blowing Up Satellites
In the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty “peaceful purposes” is mentioned twice
in the first four paragraphs.153 The preamble of a treaty is the “primary source of
interpretation” for a treaty.154 The preamble cannot create any legal commitments, but
it does spell out the intent of the operative clauses that follow in the treaty. 155 “Peaceful
uses” is a complex phrase to define, though. As Bin Cheng astutely pointed out in his
paper The Legal Status of Outer Space, the phrase “peaceful purposes” was en vogue
around the time of drafting the Outer Space Treaty.156 Several U.N. Resolutions,
148
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including the formation of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the
main body for outer space law and policy, as well as national policies of the United
States and the Soviet Union all referred to peace and peacefulness.157 Cheng finishes
the thought with “[t]he old adage, Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you desire peace,
prepare for war) was given a new twist.” 158
Two predominant definitions are espoused by various nations to describe
“peaceful uses.” The first is advocacy of peaceful meaning non-military; the second
defines peaceful as non-aggressive.159 The Vienna Convention also prescribes using
the actions of the state parties to a treaty as a means of interpretation. Since the
inception of outer space resolutions and declarations, nearly all of them mention
“peaceful” in some manner, yet the uses of space have always been predominantly for
military uses more than scientific or commercial.160
Based on the continued uses for military purposes before and after the Outer Space
Treaty, one would almost be forced to define peaceful as non-aggressive as a matter
of customary international law. Even if accepting this view of the meaning of peaceful,
one would then have to define aggressive. The United States, in its justifications for
the non-aggressive reading, cites the U.N. Charter that allows for self-defense.161 Does
that mean preemptive strikes on critical military space assets for an earth-based action?
The difficulty with the definition of “peaceful uses” leaves defining an ASAT weapon
as a WMD as the most expedient and clear way to their illegality.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE STAKES ARE SKYROCKETING
The legality of ASAT weapons is looming ever larger today.162 The trend in
international schools of thought regarding outer space has shifted from global
institutionalism (emphasizing cooperation) toward space nationalism (focusing on
conflict) in recent decades.163 The shift began when the United States pulled out of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2001.164 The ABM was one of the treaties that
could prevent further development of kinetic ASAT weapons because of their nature
of often being a ballistic missile intercept weapon.165 Recently, the Trump
administration reiterated the space superiority outlook of the nationalists and
announced the policy goal of establishing a branch of the armed forces dedicated to
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outer space.166 Globally, China is now a major space-faring nation that has tested
ASAT weapons in orbit, and Russia is purported to have developed a new ASAT
weapon as recently as October of 2018.167 India became the newest entrant in the space
arms race when it successfully tested a kinetic ASAT weapon in March of 2019.168 At
the same time, the space industry is exploding with new national and private interests
investing billions of dollars in technology and research.169 The escalation of potential
hostilities that could extend into outer space is counter to the mission of the U.N. and
the Outer Space Treaty: reserving outer space for the peaceful uses of all.
As space becomes more populated with private assets, an increasing amount of
economic activity relies on space infrastructure. Economic activities themselves are
moving to outer space. Private companies are launching plans to try to harvest
resources from space,170 carrying military hardware into space,171 and planning to send
tourists into space.172 The threat to civilians in an outer space battlefield only increases
as civilians move into space in greater numbers. It is that high likelihood of civilians
suffering the ill effects of destroyed space infrastructure, or being denied access to
space, as a result of debris or direct targeting, that makes the use of debris-causing
ASAT weapons illegal.
Still, there is too much room for argument. In what would seem like a tremendous
change in outlook for several current national governments, efforts should focus on
ensuring peace outside our atmosphere and protecting our space infrastructure. Nonbinding resolutions and codes-of-conduct are attempting to fill gaps in international
law, 173 but recommitment to the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty would be a strong
start. Talks to create more concrete international law to specifically ban weapons of
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all kinds from outer space, including ASAT weapons, should be the goal. In the
meantime, a strong argument can be made that current international law prohibits the
use of kinetic and other debris-causing ASAT weapons due to their indiscriminate and
massively destructive effects on the space environment and the critical reliance of
civilian infrastructure upon it.
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